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RECENT CASES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CHARGE FOR INSPECTION-PATAPSO GuANo Co. v.
BOARD OF AGRICULTURE, x8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 562.-Evidence tending to show that
money collected under an inspection law was in part applied to other purposes
than paying for the inspection, does tend to show that the money is taken as a
tax on Interstate Commerce.rather than as a charge for inspection,in the absence
of proof that the charge is so seriously in excess of what is necessary for the
objects designed to be effected as to justify the imputation of bad faith. Act of
N. C., Jan. 2, r891, imposing an inspection tax of 25 cents a: ton on fertilizers
and making an inspection a prerequisite to a right to sell fertilizers, held consti-
tutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INJUNCTIoN-HYDRAULIC MINING-NORTH BLOOM-
FIELD GRAVEL MINING Co. v. U. S., 88 FED. 664.-The United States has a
right to regulate hydraulic mining to prevent injury to navigable waters.
The mere fact that penalties are imposed on all parties found violating the
provisions of 27, Stat. 507, prohibiting hydraulic mining, which would affect
the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers, except under government supervision,
does not prevent the issuance of an injunction to protect the property rights
of the government in the rivers.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MANDATORY INJUNCTION-" FRAUD ORDERS "-FAIR-
FIED .FLORAL Co. v. BRADBURY, 87 FED. REP. 415.-An injunction restraining
defendant from continuing to interrupt the usual course of business in a post
office by the non-delivery of letters to the persons two whom they are addressed
and by returning them to their senders in accordance with a "fraud order "
from the Postmaster-General, is not mandatory. Obiter the Statute by author.
ity of which "fraud orders" are issued is unjust and unconstitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-EXPENDITURES IN AID
OF INDIVIDUALS.-MERCER V. FLOYD, 53 N. Y. Supp. 433. The NewYork State
Constitution forbids any municipality to give any money to or in aid of an
individual, or to incur any debt except for municipal purposes. Therefore. a
law is unconstitutional which provides that a municipalty may raise by tax-
ation money to reimburse tax collectors for tax moneys lost by the failure of
the bank in which they were deposited.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RFEGULATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH-PLUMBERS' LI-
CENSES-UNIFORMITY.-STATEv. GARDNER. 5i N. E. Rep. 136 (Ohio). Section i,
92 Ohio Laws, p. 263. entitled "1An act to promote the public health and reg-
ulate the sanitary construction of house drainage and plumbing," provides
that "every person, firm, or corporation, engaged in the business of plumb-
ing, shall first secure a license" . . . "in case of a firm or corporation,
the examination and licensing of any one member of such firm. or the man-
ager of such corporation, shall satisfy the requirements of the act." In an
action for the violation of the above act, the court held the law to be unconsti-
tutional. The right to labor and enjoy its fruits is a natural right, subject to
reasonable regulation tending to secure the comfort, health or protection of
the community. The pursuit of plumbing naturally falls under this regulation,
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but such aregulating act must impose equal burdens upon those of the same
class. The above act, therefore, permitting firms and coroporations to employ
such journeymen as they may choose, whether they be licensed or not, operates
unequally and is unconstitutional.
CONSTRUCTION OF A STATUTE-PRACTICE OF MEDICINE-CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE-STATE V. MYLOD 4o AtI. Rep. (R. I.) 753., Gen. Laws, C. 165 § 2, of
Rhode Island. make it unlawful for any person to "practice medicine" in any
of its branches without registering his authority.
It was held that one who opened an office, and called himself a doctor,
but who used no medicines, simply praying for the relief of his patients, was
not one who "practiced medicine," and hence need not register his authority.
CONTRACTS-IMPLIED CONTRACT--!COMITY-SMITH ET AL. V. TAGGART, 87 FED.
REP. 95.-A mutual benefit association organized under the laws of New Hamp-
shire carried on its business by collecting small amounts monthly from the per-
sons subscribing to its stock. The concern becoming insolvent, a receiver was
appointed in New Hampshire and another subsequently in Colorado, the
association having done business in several States. A subscriber, resident in
Colorado, sought to have the assets.collected there distributed solely among
subscribers residing in that State. Held, that there wn's an implied contract
between the subscribers that in case of insolvency they should share in pro-
portion to the amount each had paid in. This being so, and it being more
convenient for one court to make the distribution, comity requires that the
court in which a suit to liquidate the affairs of the association was first
brought should do this. A court of equity in another State acquiring posses-
sion of assets, has a right and is under a duty to transmit them to the first
court.
CONTRACTS-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-NEGLIGENCE--LIABILITY OF EM-
PLOYER-BERG V. PARSONS, 5i, N. E. Rep. 957 (N. Y.). The defendant employed
one Tobin to blast rock and excavate on premises adjacent to those of the
plaintiff, in doing which the latter's premises were greatly damaged.
During the trial it appeared that the work was of a particularly hazardous
nature and that the person employed to perform the work was both incom-
petent and reckless. Neither was the employer zealous in obtaining a com-
petent man. Held, that the defendant was not responsible for any damage
that might have resulted. The relation of master and servant did not exist.
See Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48; Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N. Y. 507;
Roemer v. Striker, 142 N. Y. 134; 36 N. E. 8o8. "If a rule contrary to the
above were established, it would not only impose upon the owner of real
property an improper restraint in contracting for its improvement, but would
open a new and unlimited field for actions for the negligence of others
which has not hitherto existed in this State."
Gray, J., dissented, on the ground that the work contracted for being
obviously hazardous a legal duty was imposed upon the person employing the
contractor to use a reasonable amount of care in the selection of one who
was both competent and careful and that a failure to perform that duty ren-
dered him liable for damages occasioned by the negligence.
DA.MAGFS-DANGEROUS PREMISES-INJURY TO CHILD-LURESS v. NEw
YORK S. W. R. Co., 40 Alt. Rep. (N.Y.) 614. A railway company which main-
tains upon its own land a turntable, which is attractive to young children, as
an object of amusement, is not liable for an injury to a child who comes
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upon the land and receives the injury by playing with the turntable. An invi-
tation cannot be implied from the fact that the turntable: designed for another
purpose, furnishes a place for play.
Ludlow, J., dissenting. Del., L. &. W. R. Co. v. Reich, 4o Atl. (N. J.) 682
Dixon, Ludlow and Kruiger, J. J., dissenting, held similarly.
DAMAGES-DEATH OF STEPFATHER-RIGHT OF ACTION -MARSHALL V.
MACON SASH, DOOR & LUMBER Co.-3o S. E. (Ga.) 571. Civil Code, sec.
3828, giving, I A widow, or if no widow, a child or children," a right to re-
cover "' for the homicide of the husband or parent," held, not to give a child
such right of action for the homicide of its stepfather. Although in Holloway
v. Holloway, 86 Ga. .576, 12 S. E. 943, it was held that one who undertakes to
care for stepchildren is the head of a fanily, under the homestead law, yet
the present Statute is in derogation of the common law, and must be strictly
construed.
DAMAGES-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF
SERVANTS.-CONNELLY ET UX. v. MAYOR, etc., OF CITY OF NASHVILLE., 46 S. W.
Rep. 565. When plaintiff receives personal injury as the result of the negli-
gent acts of the driver of a street sprinkling cart owned and operated by the
City, it was held that the City is not liable for such negligent acts, since it is
thereby engaged in the discharge of a govenmental duty in promoting the
general health, as distinguished from a duty purely corporate or ministerial.
DAMAGES-NEGLECT OF GRAVES.-GEORGE V. CYPRESS HILLS CEMETERY,
52 N. Y. Supp 1o97.-Plaintiff in visiting the grave of her husband, situated
in what was called the "public ground," in defendant's cemetery, was poisoned
by poison ivy growing thereon. Defendant was not hired to give special
care to the grave, and only mowed and cleared up the ground once or twice a
year. It did not appear that the ivy had been growing there for any great
length of time, or that defendant knew of its presence. Held, defendant was
not liable on the ground of negligence. Woodward. and Hatch, J. J., dissent
in lengthy opinion, citing especially Crowhurst v. Burial Board, 4 Exch.
Div. 5, where the cemetery was held responsible for the death of plaintiff's
horse, which had browsed on the leaves of yew trees planted in the cemetery,
on the analogy of Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. I Exch. 265, at page 279.
ENLISTMENT MINOR- SOLOMON SHERIFF V. DAVENPORT-87 Fed., Rep.
318. The provision of the United States Statutes. R. S. 17, requiring the
written consent of a parent or guardian to the enlistment of a minor, is for
the benefit of the parent or guardian, and confers no privilege on the
minor.
EQUITY-JURISDICTION - INJUNCTION - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-STANDARD
FASHION Co. v: SIEGEL-CooPER Co. ET AL., 52 N. Y. Suppl. 433. A court of
equity cannot decree specific performance of a contract when the business in-
volved would be of a continuous nature, and thus brought under the manage-
ment of the court; but it will enjoin the violation of a negative covenant by
which defendant agreed "not to sell or allow to be sold on its premises dur-
ing the duration of this contract any other make of paper patterns." Fargo
v. Railroad Co., 23 N. Y. Supp. 360, cited as sustaining this view in its
reasoning, although opposed in its result. See also Singer Sewing Mach.
Co. v. Union Buttonhole and Embroidery Co., Fed. Cas. No. 12,904; Chicago
6-- A. Ry. Co. v. N. Y., L. E. &. W. R. Co., 24Fed. 521; Pomeroy Eq. Juris.,
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see. iii. From this opinion, Ingraham, J., vigorously dissents, and cites
Fargo v. Railroad Co., supra, as sustaining his view. Such cases as
Lumley v. Wagner, i De Gex, M. and G. 6o4, and the cases in the Federal
Courts referred to in the majority opinion, are exceptions to the general rule
that equity cannot enforce performance of contracts involving personal ser-
vice; and they all appear to be based upon the peculiar nature of the service
to be rendered, which was either public or extraordinary in character.
EVIDENCE-ACCOUNT BOOKS-REFRESHING MEIMORY.-CLARK v. NATIONAL
SHOE AND LEATHER BANK. ETC., 52 N. Y. Supp. 1o64. "When a witness has
so far forgotten the facts that he cannot recall them, even after looking at a
memorandum of them, and he testifies that he once knew them, and made a
memorandum of them at the time or soon after they transpired. which he in-
tended to make correctly, and which he believes to be correct, such memo-
randum, in his own handwriting, may be received as evidence of the facts
therein contained, although the witness has no present recollection of them."
Rule quoted from Howard v. AfcDonough, 77 N. Y. 592, and construed to
apply equally reasonably to a witness who testifies to such a memorandum,
made by another than himself.
EVIDENCE-LIBEL-VAN INGEN XV MAIL AND EXPRESS PUB. Co., 50 N. E.
979.-In an action for libel, the accusation was based on an article in an
evening newspaper charging that "the London head of a large New York
firm of cloth jobbers" was engaged in raising a fund in England to be used in
bribing voters at an election for President of the United States, the plaintiff,
for the purpose of showing that the article was published of and concerning him,
offered evidence that similar articles, making the same charge against him
by name. and describing him as the London representative, etc., bad been
published in the three newspapers of large circulation in the same place where
defendant's paper was published on the morning of the day when defendant
published the article complained of. Held, that the evidence was admissible.
Bartlett, Haight and Vance dissented on the ground that the evidence was
purely hearsay.
INSURANCE-CoNsTRUCTION-BERGER V. PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INS. Co, 88
Fed. Rep 24o.-A clause in an accident insurance policy excepting the insurer
from liability ',for intentional injuries inflected by the assured or any other
person." does not include injuries or death at the hands of an insane person.
Insane persons are held incapable of doing "intentional" injuries.
PAITNERsHIP-DISSOLUTION-RENEWAL-COLUMBIA BANK V. BEROLZHEIMER,
53 N. Y. Supp. 4 17.-A limited co-partnership is solely a creature of Statute.
If it once ceases to exist by the expiration of the period named in the agree-
ment and certificate filed in pursuance of the Statute, it cannot thereafter be
continued by the subsequent filing of a renewal certificate, and, if the business
is continued, the special partner becomes a general partner. In order to
renew, action must be taken at or prior to the time fixed for its termination.
PATENTS-SPECIFICATONS-INFRINGE.MIENT-VELSBACH LIGHT Co. v. SUN-
LIGHT INCANDESCENT GAS LAMP Co., 87 Fed. Rep. 222.-Plaintiff's patent was
for an application of one of a class of materials to a substance long known
but never commercially usable until the application was made. Held, that a
patentee in his specifications is not obliged to state all the known equivalents
of the materials used by him. A patent of an invention of pioneer rank
should be held to cover a broad range of equivalents.
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PERSONS-MARRIAGE ON THE HIGH SEAS-NORMAN v. NORMAN, 54 Pac.
144 (Cal.)-Plaintiff and defendant, with the intent and for the purpose of
evading the laws of their domicile, went upon the high seas and went
through a form of marriage, returning on its completion. Held, thbt the mar-
riage was void, it not complying with the requirements of the law of the
domicil, though the general rule is that a marriage good in the place where it
is celebrated, even though the parties went thither to evade the laws of their
domicil and return home immediately, is good everywhere; yet there being
no law of marriage on the high seas this rule cannot govern. The marriage
to be valid must be in accordance with the laws of the domicil.
PRACTICE-COERCING JURY-SETTING ASIDE VERDICT-PEOPLE V. SHELDON,
5o N. E. 84o (N. Y.)-At the close of a trial for murder, which had lasted seven
weeks, the jury on Thursday returned three times between then and Saturday
morning, stating each time that they were unable to agree. On Saturday after-
noon they were again brought in and the judge addressed them, stating to
them the importance of the case, the expense to the State and the necessity of
reaching a verdict. The jury were then locked up again until Monday morn-
ing, suitable arrangements being made for meals, etc. Held, such action by
the judge amounted to coercion.
PRACTICE-DISQUALIFICATION OF A JUDGE FOR INTEREST-MEYER V. CITY
OF SAN DIEGO, 53 Pac. 434 (Cal.).-A suit was brought to set aside a contract
with a city and to enjoin the issuance of bonds to pay for it. The result of
holding the contract good and allowing the issuance of the bonds would be to
increase the taxation of the city for a term of years. Held, that a judge
holding taxable property in the city was disqualified to try the suit.
PRACTICE-INCONSISTENT-VERDICT, DAVIS V. STATE, 238, 77 S. (Miss.).-Two
men were jointly indicted and tried for the same offense. The State produced
but one witness, who gave exactly the same testimony as to each. Held,
Terral, J., dissenting, that a verdict in which the jury convicted one and
disagreed as to the other, was inconsistent and a ground for new trial.
PRACTICE-MINORITY OF JUROR-STATE V. BUTTON, 23 S. 868 (La. Ann.).-
Where a verdict was given by a jury,'which the accused had an opportunity
to examine and challenge, a new trial will not be granted because one of the
jurors is subsequently found to have been a minor.
SALES-WHAT CONSTITUTES A SALE-BAILMENT-JOHNSON V. ALLEN,,40 Alt.
(Conn.) io56.-The plaintiff delivered grain to the defendant under an agree-
ment whereby the plaintiff was to purchase for and deliver to defendant for
sale. the latter agreeing to pay plaintiff the cost price and one cent per bushel
additional, during the month after its sale by him. The defendant had the
right to sell to whom he saw fit, and was to be responsible for all sales, and
collect bills for the same. Under this agreement it was held that the delivery
constituted a bailment, and not a sale, and that defendant was not liable for
grain received until he sold it.
TRADE MARKS-INFRINGEMENT-P. LORILLARD CO. V. PEPxR, 86 Fed. Rep.
956.-In deciding whether one trade mark is an infringement on another or
not. "one is to be guided very largely by the judgment one forms by the use
of one's eyesight," not in accordance with elaborate descriptions of the points
of resemblance and difference. The fact that in isolated instances purchasers
